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In this lecture I want to explore how it was that the UK became committed so 
quickly to military intervention in Libya following the outbreak of protests 
against the Gaddafi regime - and specifically to the removal of Gaddafi 
himself - given that as a nation we are still embroiled in Afghanistan and 
licking our wounds over Iraq. I will attempt some possible explanations, and 
suggest areas for further research at the interface between UK foreign and 
domestic policy. I make clear at the outset that I am no expert on Libya; I 
speak rather as someone who has witnessed a great deal of international 
intervention in a variety of forms over many years, and who believes that we 
need a much greater focus on ourselves as interveners if we are to 
understand intervention properly and do it better in future. 
 
In January 2010 David Cameron’s Conservative party published a National 
Security Green Paper, which included a commitment to “reducing the need for 
military intervention by building a capacity for preventative action, including  
diplomacy led by the FCO and for contributions from a wider range of 
government departments”. That was welcomed by those of us who have long 
regretted the run-down of our diplomatic capability and detailed area 
understanding. Yet 14 months later, as Prime Minister, Mr Cameron played a 
leading role in mobilising the international community in support of military 
intervention in Libya.  
 
During the tumultuous events in January and February, first in Tunisia then in 
Egypt, Libya was relatively quiet. Then, on 16 February, riots broke out in 
Benghazi in the eastern part of the country, which has long had a mutually 
antagonistic relationship with Gaddafi. On 17 February, the Foreign Secretary, 
William Hague, was making a statement in the House of Commons about the 
situation in Bahrain. Asked about Libya, he said "we call on the government of 
Libya to recognise the right to peaceful protest and to avoid the excessive use 
of force". However the violence continued and on 18 February it was reported 
that dozens of protesters were said to have been killed by the security forces.  
 
Interestingly for the purposes of this analysis, the UK Parliament then took a 
week’s break. The Prime Minister left for the Middle East heading a trade 
delegation that - controversially - included a number of arms manufacturers. 
Meanwhile the protests in Libya spread to other parts of the country, including 
the capital, Tripoli. There were also reports of Gaddafi using his air force to 
bomb civilian targets to contain the uprising against him. Fears began to rise 
for the fate of foreign nationals caught up in the fighting, including a good 
number of UK citizens, and political pressure on the UK government to rescue 
them began to grow. While the PM was away, on 21 February, William Hague 
- in Brussels for an EU foreign ministers meeting - said he had been told 
Gaddafi might have fled to Venezuela. On the same day the Deputy Head of 
the Libyan Mission to the UN in New York requested the UN Security Council 
to take action to prevent further violence in Libya, and in particular to impose 
a no-fly zone to prevent Gaddafi's forces from attacking civilians.  
 
On 22 February, William Hague said the Libyan state was collapsing, but on 
the same day Gaddafi made his first TV appearance in Tripoli since the 
outbreak of the crisis, vowing to fight “to the last drop of blood”. Meanwhile 
reports of violence and atrocities continued. On 23 February the UN Security 
Council held an emergency meeting to discuss Libya and issued a press 
statement (SC/10180) calling on the government of Libya to "meet its 
responsibility to protect its population ... to act with restraint, to respect human 
rights and international humanitarian law, and to allow immediate access for 
international human rights monitors and humanitarian agencies”.  
 
On 24 February the Daily Mail carried a headline "British rescue turns to 
farce", as the plane meant to evacuate British nationals from Libya was 
grounded at Gatwick airport by a technical fault. However, while the 
government faced criticism for its handling of this aspect of the crisis, its 
diplomats were active behind the scenes at the UN (as the Prime Minister 
confirmed in his statement to the House of Commons the following week). On 
25 February the UN Human Rights Council discussed a proposal to expel 
Libya (the expulsion was confirmed by the UN General Assembly on 1 
March). Then on Saturday 26 February the UN Security Council unanimously 
passed Resolution 1970, which referred the Gaddafi regime to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) for possible "crimes against humanity", and 
imposed an arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze. In other words, a 
very tough set of measures, passed remarkably quickly by Security Council 
standards, and without any abstentions - quite an achievement for the 
sponsors of the Resolution. On the same day both President Obama and 
Secretary of State Clinton were quoted as saying Gaddafi "must leave now". 
 
Returning to UK domestic politics, with Parliament due to reconvene on 
Monday 28th February, on 27 February the Labour MP and former 
International Development Secretary, Douglas Alexander, called on the Prime 
Minister to come to the House of Commons "not just to explain why the 
Foreign Office got its evacuation plans so badly wrong at the start, but how 
Britain can be a leader and not a follower in the efforts to increase the 
pressure on Gaddafi to stand down". Thus the scene was set for David 
Cameron's statement to the House on 28 February. 
 
Much of the statement was about the evacuation of UK nationals, where as 
we have seen the government was feeling the political heat. But the most 
striking aspect of the Prime Minister's statement was his uncompromising 
stance towards Gaddafi: "I turn to the pressure that we are now putting on 
Gaddafi's regime. We should be clear that for the future of Libya and its 
people, Col Gaddafi's regime must end and he must leave.” The PM referred 
to the UK's efforts at the UN to bring about a Security Council Resolution, 
describing Gaddafi's "murderous regime" and pointing to the ICC referral, 
which would mean that Libya's leaders could "face the justice they deserve". 
On military intervention he said "we do not in any way rule out the use of 
military assets" and said he would ask the Chief of Defence Staff and the MoD 
to work with allies on a plan for a no-fly zone over Libya. He said "it is clear 
that this is an illegitimate regime that has lost the consent of its people, and 
our message to Col Gaddafi is simple: go now." He added that “There is a real 
danger now of a humanitarian crisis inside Libya”. 
 
This was a strong statement, supported by the Leader of the Opposition, who 
on the subject of Gaddafi said: "I think that the whole House will endorse the 
Prime Minister's view that the only acceptable future is one without Col 
Gaddafi and his regime." Thus there was a remarkable degree of cross-party 
agreement about the need to remove the Libyan leader, only 12 days after the 
initial outbreak of violence. 
 
Although there was subsequently quite a lot of to-ing and fro-ing about 
whether a no-fly zone really was an effective means of resolving the crisis, 
with the US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, in particular questioning the 
level of military intervention this would require, it would seem that for David 
Cameron at least the die was already cast. There was further embarrassment 
for the British government the following week with the Daily Mail reporting on 
7 March "SAS troops rounded up and booted out as Libyan MI5 mission turns 
to farce”, but on the international front things were moving Mr Cameron’s way. 
There were statements on Libya by the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference on 8 March, by the Peace and Security Committee of the African 
Union on 10 March, crucially by the Arab League - calling for a no-fly zone 
over Libya - on 12 March, by the UN Secretary-General - calling for an 
immediate ceasefire - on 16 March, culminating on 17 March with the 
passage of UNSCR 1973.  
 
This Resolution authorised military action against Libya, although this time 
five Security Council members abstained (Brazil, China, Germany, India, and 
Russia). The explanations of vote of the abstaining members make interesting 
reading. All deplored the violence in Libya and were critical of the Gaddafi 
regime. But Germany "saw great risks" in undertaking military action and said 
"the likelihood of large-scale loss of life should not be underestimated". India 
regretted that the Resolution had been passed without waiting for the report of 
the Secretary-General's Envoy to Libya and argued that the resolution "was 
based on very little clear information ... there must be certainty that negative 
outcomes were not likely before such wide-ranging measures were adopted. 
Political efforts must be the priority in resolving the situation." Brazil was 
concerned that the measures approved might have the unintended effect of 
exacerbating the current tensions on the ground and "causing more harm than 
good to the very same civilians we are committed to protecting". Both China 
and Russia prioritised peaceful means of resolving the conflict and said that 
many questions had not been answered in regard to the provisions of the 
Resolution, including how and by whom the measures would be enforced and 
what the limits of the engagement would be. As subsequent events have 
shown, all these comments were very pertinent. 
 
It should be emphasised that, even as the Resolution was being passed, 
Gaddafi's forces were reversing some of their earlier territorial losses, had 
retaken the key town of Adjabiya, and were threatening the main opposition 
stronghold of Benghazi. Although Gaddafi initially reacted by declaring a 
ceasefire, this was quickly revealed to be a sham and on the basis of past 
statements by him and his sons there appeared to be an imminent threat of a 
massacre. In justifying the NATO-led Operation Odyssey Dawn shortly after it 
began on Saturday 19 March David Cameron said "we have all seen the 
appalling brutality that Col Gaddafi has meted out against his own people. 
And far from introducing the ceasefire he spoke about he has actually stepped 
up the atrocities and the brutality that we all see.” 
 
The most fervent advocates of the intervention have sought to justify it in 
terms of a "humanitarian crisis", or an impending "humanitarian catastrophe". 
The "H" word is probably one of those most abused by politicians - and, dare I 
say it in this distinguished audience, even by scholars. Let us remember that 
the word "humanitarian" describes an altruistic intention translated into action 
consistent with that intention; i.e. an intervention resting on a belief that our 
common humanity alone creates an obligation to relieve suffering and 
distress. In its more technical application, under international humanitarian 
law, it means treating the victims of conflict equally, regardless of which side 
of the conflict they are on. 
 
Therefore, if Libya was facing a "humanitarian crisis" it meant that people on 
both sides of the fighting needed assistance and protection, and that the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) should be given unrestricted 
access to them. This would include access to both sets of combatants and to 
civilians fleeing the fighting and congregating, for example, on the Tunisian 
and Egyptian borders. This, one might think, ought to have been the first 
priority of the international community when the fighting erupted in February. 
And yet, although all three Security Council documents refer to the 
importance of humanitarian access and respect for international humanitarian 
law, this was decidedly not the main focus of official statements in the UK.   
 
In the years following the end of the Cold War the term "humanitarian 
intervention" came to be used, by both politicians and academics, to describe 
coercive military intervention for ostensibly humanitarian reasons. I say 
"ostensibly" because almost inevitably, when a decision to use force is taken, 
considerations other than purely humanitarian ones come into play. So, under 
the Just War tradition formulated by Christian theologians from St Augustine 
onwards, one of the principles is "reasonable prospects of success" i.e. you 
do not fight a Just War unless you are reasonably confident you can win - 
otherwise it ceases to be just. Equally, when Tony Blair gave his famous 
Chicago speech in 1999 one of his five "considerations" before undertaking 
military intervention to right wrongs was "do we have national interests 
involved?" Therefore, so-called “humanitarian intervention” can immediately 
be seen to be much less straightforward than is claimed. It usually involves – 
as in the case of Libya – coercive action against a tyrant abusing the human 
rights of his own people; this is often controversial and always complicated. 
 
By the end of the 1990s the concept of “humanitarian intervention” had 
become discredited because of the manifest failure of the international 
community to act in a concerted, consistent, and effective way to deal with 
mass atrocities committed in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo and elsewhere. 
Instead the UN adopted the new concept of “The Responsibility to Protect". 
This affirmed member states’ primary responsibility to protect their own 
citizens, but said that where they were unable or unwilling to do so, there was 
a place for collective action by members of the UN, including by coercive 
means if necessary. 
 
Since it was adopted by the General Assembly in 2005 and endorsed by the 
Security Council in April 2006 "R2P", as it is known, has been honoured more 
in the breach than the observance (for example in the case of Darfur). It was 
therefore highly significant that first the Security Council Statement SC/10180 
on 23 February, then both the Resolutions, 1970 and 1973, used the 
language of R2P, by calling on Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its 
people. This will no doubt give support to those who argue that, in addition to 
its undisputed force as an ethical imperative, R2P is beginning to acquire the 
status of customary international law. However one can be sure that this will 
continue to be debated by international law and international relations 
academics for many years to come! 
 
In fact, over the years, where the Security Council has been of a common 
mind it has managed to justify international intervention to address violations 
of human rights on the grounds of a "threat to international peace and 
security" (which, other than self defence, is the only basis for military action 
under the UN Charter). In the case of the Libyan crisis it might be argued that 
the immediate threat to international peace and security was actually quite 
limited, with the main issues relating to what was happening within Libya’s 
borders. Nevertheless, the preamble to UN SCR 1970 states that the Security 
Council is "mindful of its responsibilities for international peace and security" 
and UN SCR 1973 refers to the Security Council's "determining that the 
situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security". And, in fairness, some would argue that the prospect of large 
numbers fleeing the country in response to the violence would indeed 
constitute such a threat. 
 
So, the Security Council has no difficulty justifying international intervention 
when it is minded to do so. The issues are always around the politics of the 
situation and in this case it was a political triumph for the UK and her allies to 
secure a unanimous vote for UN SCR 1970 and to avoid a veto of UN SCR 
1973. However, problems started almost immediately in terms of whether the 
protection of civilians could be achieved without aggressive military action 
over and above the enforcement of a no-fly zone (as Robert Gates had 
feared) and, ultimately, without regime change; although both the UK and the 
US had already declared this was their political objective, they also had to 
acknowledge it was not mandated by UNSCR 1973. That is the game we are 
still playing now, over five weeks later. In that sense, and not for the first time, 
the US and the UK settled for a Resolution that pushed at the limits of what 
was politically acceptable, although it did not give them what they really 
wanted – a licence to remove Gaddafi. 
 
There is no doubt that the Security Council would not have acted as it did 
without some highly effective diplomacy from the UK and her allies. The 
question to which I now return is: why did the UK decide so early in the day 
that its political objective was the removal of Gaddafi? As already stated, from 
a purely humanitarian point of view there is a strong argument that the priority 
should have been to intervene to broker a ceasefire and to create the space 
for a political settlement between Gaddafi and his opponents. Given the 
willingness of the OIC, the Arab League, the AU, and Turkey to engage with 
this conflict this might have been a more obvious focus for diplomacy in the 
early stages of the crisis. But by pushing for such a strongly worded Security 
Council Statement on 23 February, and by characterising Gaddafi in the way 
the Prime Minister did in the Commons on 28 February, the room for 
manoeuvre was seriously restricted. As with the coalition intervention in 
Afghanistan in 2001/2 the language of victory and punishment crowded out 
the language of peace and reconciliation.  
 
This was in sharp contrast to the more measured international response to the 
violence elsewhere in the Middle East, both before the Libyan crisis erupted 
and subsequently. There is no denying the extreme nature of Gaddafi's 
response to the protests against him, nor the bloodcurdling nature of the 
threats made by him and other members of his family. And, as subsequent 
events in Misrata and elsewhere have shown, these threats were not empty. 
But by moving so quickly to suggest that Gaddafi may have been guilty of 
crimes against humanity (as per SCR 1970) the UK and its allies left 
themselves little room to manoeuvre to mediate a halt to the fighting in the 
hope that a political settlement could be found. 
 
Then, when the warnings contained in SCR 1970 did not work, the West had 
little option but to move to more coercive measures. In that sense it was a 
victim of its own earlier rhetoric; the parallels with the situation in which NATO 
found itself in late 1998 when Milosevic paid no attention to its threats 
concerning Kosovo are instructive. However, taking the military route is a high 
risk strategy. If the campaign is over quickly it is hailed as a success; if it 
drags on it can become extremely unpopular. The willingness to contemplate 
a military intervention in Libya was perhaps surprising given the difficulties 
encountered - and, one would hope, lessons learned - in Somalia, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq. In all these cases a lack of understanding of the local 
political economy led to an unrealistic sense of what an intervention from 
outside could hope to achieve, and to subsequent failure on a grand scale. 
Somalia is still in deep trouble, Iraq is fragile, and in Afghanistan we are still 
trying to find a way out of the mess we helped to create. Less than a year 
after coming into office with a promise of a new foreign and security policy 
David Cameron was prepared to take the risk of military intervention - why? 
 
An obvious explanation is that the Government believed that Gaddafi would 
not last very long, and that calling for his removal was therefore a relatively 
safe option. William Hague's unfortunate remark about Venezuela on 22 
February would seem to suggest this, as would suggestions from other 
members of the foreign policy establishment in the UK that it would not take 
long for Gaddafi's generals to "sort him out". If this wishful thinking determined 
the direction of UK foreign policy it was a grievous error. And, as the 
subsequent mission to Benghazi that went embarrassingly wrong suggested, 
not enough was known about the opposition to justify backing them from the 
start to defeat a much more heavily armed and better organised Gaddafi. It 
was apparent at the time that we knew very little about Libya as a tribal 
society dominated by an authoritarian leader or about the long-standing 
antipathy between the eastern and western halves of the country. So it is 
possible that the very definite nature of the UK position reflected either a 
failure of intelligence, or of local knowledge, or a misjudgement based on the 
lack of either. In other words, the UK government may simply have made a 
miscalculation about the "reasonable prospect of success" of an intervention 
to bring about regime change in Libya.  
 
In addition, it must be remembered that in the first week of the crisis the 
government was very much on the back foot and needed to re-establish its 
credibility with its own domestic constituency. The Prime Minister had been 
out of the country and there was much criticism in the media both about the 
arms sales element of his mission to the Middle East and about the delays in 
evacuating UK nationals from Libya. Hence Douglas Alexander was able to 
challenge the Prime Minister directly, not only to explain the embarrassment 
of the evacuation, but also to show he was a man, not a mouse, in dealing 
with Gaddafi. 
 
This raises the interesting question how much public opinion contributes to 
decisions to go to war, and whether the UK public has a natural tendency to 
be supportive of foreign military interventions or not. It is argued that Margaret 
Thatcher rescued her first term as Prime Minister as a result of a successful 
war with Argentina over the Falklands. Tony Blair will be remembered for 
taking us to war five times -- although neither he nor we much liked the term, 
whence "humanitarian intervention". Do we, as a society have some kind of 
pathological need for a villain, someone we can demonise, wage war on, and 
defeat -- Galtieri, Milosevic, Saddam, Gaddafi? Real-time TV and "embedded" 
journalists allow us to engage in an action packed game of virtual war, safe at 
home in our armchairs. Preventive diplomacy, third-party mediation, impartial 
humanitarian assistance, all take second place in the popular imagination to 
cruise missiles and Tornado strikes. Is this something that should worry us? 
 
Interestingly, and somewhat at variance with this characterisation, public 
opinion polls show that in the early days of the Libyan crisis the UK public was 
ambivalent at best about the wisdom of military intervention, with opposition 
growing as the prospect of a drawn-out campaign has come to seem more 
likely. Perhaps public attitudes are shifting as we leave our imperial past 
further behind and experience the harsh economic reality of life in the 21st 
century. Some commentators argue that our institutions – the military, the 
intelligence services, the foreign policy establishment, - have yet to catch up. 
 
Unlike a US President, a British Prime Minister does not have to seek the 
approval of the elected representatives of the people in order to declare war. 
But this has not made the UK more likely than the US to describe military 
intervention as "war", even where this might be the most honest description, 
as in the case of Libya. Here, although the coalition is clearly supporting the 
opposition in its war against Gaddafi this is unlikely ever to be spoken of in 
these terms, given the language of UNSCR 1973, which is based on the 
protection of civilians. This, I suggest, is not a healthy situation in a 
democracy. Let us hope it does not lead to the situation faced by our troops in 
Afghanistan, where for a long time we were at peace in Whitehall but very 
much at war on the ground. Significantly, as of mid-April, the ICRC’s position 
is that there are now two armed conflicts in Libya: an internal one between 
Gaddafi and his opponents, and an international one between the coalition 
and the Libyan regime. This has consequences in terms of creating 
obligations under international humanitarian law, and is surely a more honest 
description of what is actually happening. 
 
In his statement to the House of Commons on 18 March following the 
adoption of UNSCR 1973 David Cameron sought to justify the bombing of 
Libya in very simple terms: demonstrable need, regional support, and a clear 
legal basis. President Obama and other senior members of the Administration 
have spoken with equal clarity and it is hard to argue with them. It is fair to 
ask, though, whether a Security Council Resolution alone is sufficient to 
bestow legitimacy in the absence of a popular mandate at national level. In 
the case of the UK it could be said this was provided by the absence of major 
opposition in the House of Commons on 28 February, but in contrast to this is 
the lack of strong public support as revealed by the opinion polls. How much 
public support does a Prime Minister need in order to go to war? However, 
ultimately the main issue is not whether the intervention is legitimate, rather 
whether it is wise; one can always make a case, but is it the right thing to do? 
This, perhaps only history can judge.     
 
In this lecture I have asked some questions about the interaction between 
foreign and domestic politics in the UK’s intervention in Libya that I believe 
would benefit from further research. Does the UK have a natural predilection 
for military intervention, while being reluctant to call this "war"? If so, does this 
come from the foreign policy establishment or the people? Have we lost sight 
of the need to promote peace among warring parties, as opposed to 
supporting one side to victory over the other? Do we still value neutral, 
independent, humanitarian action as the primary means of carrying out our 
"responsibility to protect" civilians caught up in armed conflict? 
 
I suggest that the challenge for academics and policymakers alike is to 
attempt a serious answer to these questions and to arrive at a point where we 
take a much broader view of international intervention, using the wider range 
of instruments available to us rather than by default settling for the military 
option. International intervention can take many forms: some supportive, 
some coercive; some short-term and tactical, some long-term and strategic. 
For better or for worse, the UK has a long tradition of engaging with the wider 
world - and knows more than most about what works and what doesn’t. But in 
recent times we have neglected our capability to acquire and retain detailed 
local knowledge and understanding. If we still want to play a role on the world 
stage we need to build this up again, as the Green Paper of 2010 seemed to 
promise. We do have a choice; it is up to us to use it wisely. 
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